Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2022

Sacred Land, Not the Sacrificial Lamb: An Unfair Treatment of
Native American Sacred Sites
Kaylee James

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Clemens 2
Abstract
If Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n is not overturned by the Supreme Court, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) claims of Native Americans may be foreclosed for
years to come while mainstream religions thrive. Differing notions of property ownership—
Western and Indigenous—were at the center of the conflict in Lyng, where the Court upheld the
Forest Service’s approval of the G-O Road through a sacred site in Six Rivers National Forest.
The Court did not find that the sacred site’s diminishment was a substantial harm because it
relied on the government coercion in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder in defining a
substantial harm. The precedent set by Lyng has made it nearly impossible for Native American
plaintiffs to succeed on RFRA claims, because, like Lyng, all sacred site cases involve proposed
government action on government owned land. Thus, Courts have consistently decided that Lyng
is controlling.
The Supreme Court may have an opportunity to revisit RFRA and Lyng, given the Court’s
current composition and deep support for religious freedom. Following the dismissal in Slockish
v. U.S. Federal Highway Admin., Stronghold v. United States is the most recent sacred site case
to rise to the Ninth Circuit. While similar to Lyng, the Apache Stronghold has a stronger case
because the government plans on allowing oil mining companies to physically demolish Oak
Flat, an Apache sacred site. The Apache Stronghold is also fortunate because this composition of
the Supreme Court has heavily favored religious freedom. In recent cases like Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court found in favor of religious freedom even when the burden was as
attenuated as the possibility of an employee using an insured abortifacient and the possibility
that it could stop an egg from attaching to the uterine wall. Considering the vast exemptions
created by this case, holding that the destruction of a Native American sacred site is a
substantial burden is not a stretch of the imagination. Nor is this burden as attenuated and
incomparable to mainstream religion as Lyng would have readers believe. This paper argues
that the Supreme Court should hold that a diminishment of sacredness of Native American
sacred sites on public land is a substantial burden to Native Americans’ right to free exercise
and a failure to overturn Lyng will be a violation of the Establishment Clause.
I. Introduction
Unlike the “mainstream” Abrahamic religions of the United States, the indigenous people
of the Americas practice religions that are dependent on the peace and preservation of their
sacred land. If the Eucharist’s body of Christ was a body of land, any misuse of that land would
burden the religious freedom of Catholics everywhere. Courts have treated Native American
sacred site litigation as a unique issue on the basis that there no is clear analogy between the
significance of sacred sites and other constitutionally protected religious practices. However, the
Native Americans’ belief that there is a spirit within their sacred sites is not so different from the
Christian belief of the Holy Spirit or the belief that Christ is fully present in the Eucharist. While
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the vast differences in ideologies and history regarding land ownership between Indigenous and
Western culture play a part in sacred site litigation, the real issue is the colonization of
indigenous land, which is the reason sacred sites are owned by the federal government. As a
result of colonialism, courts have not adequately protected Native Americans’ practice of
religion.
A. Standard of Review
The First Amendment of the United States’ Constitution offers two religious protections:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.”1 The Supreme Court cases Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder created
the Sherbert/Yoder test, which was used to decide Free Exercise Clause cases until the 1990s. In
Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist could not work on Saturdays for religious reasons and was
consequently fired.2 The plaintiff was then denied unemployment benefits because the
Employment Security Commission found that there was available employment, which would
require her to work on Saturdays, and held that Sherbert was failing to accept such employment
without good cause.3 The Court held that Sherbert was unconstitutionally denied unemployment
benefits because a governmental benefit was conditioned upon conduct that would violate
Sherbert's religious beliefs.4 In Yoder, Amish families wanted to withdraw their children from
public school before the age of sixteen and faced criminal sanctions as a consequence.5 The
Court held that the plaintiffs’ right to free exercise was violated because the government coerced
Amish families to act contrary to their religious beliefs or face the threat of criminal sanctions as

1

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 409.
5 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
2
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a consequence.6 As a result of these two cases, the Sherbert/Yoder test triggered strict scrutiny
when the government burdened a plaintiff’s free exercise. Strict scrutiny requires the plaintiff to
prove that there is a substantial burden on the free exercise of their religion; the government must
then prove that the burden is justified by a compelling interest and is the lease restrictive
alternative.7 A plaintiff would prevail under the Sherbert/Yoder test when a court found that the
plaintiff was forced to choose between the practice of their religious and the receipt of a
government benefit or imposition of a civil or criminal penalty. 8
The Sherbert/Yoder test was overturned, but Congress stepped in to create greater
religious freedom. In 1990, Employment Division v. Smith overturned the Sherbert/Yoder test to
the extent that a neutral, generally applicable law that burdened religion would no longer trigger
strict scrutiny and was constitutional so long as it passed a rational basis standard. 9 However,
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), which effectively
brought back the Sherbert/Yoder test at the federal level. 10 Under RFRA, if a plaintiff can prove
that the government substantially burdens their free exercise of religion, the burden shifts to the
government to prove that they have a compelling interest that is achieved by the least restrictive
means on religion.11 If the government fails to meet this burden of proof, the plaintiff will prevail
on a RFRA claim.12
Even after the passage of RFRA, Congress decided that the United States required more
religious freedom that RFRA offered. This sentiment was likely as a result of the City of Boerne

6

Id. at 231.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
8 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231.
9 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
11 Id. at sec. 1.
12 Id.
7
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v. Flores striking down RFRA as applied to the states several years after RFRA was enacted.13
To create more religious protection at the state level, Congress passed the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).14 RLUIPA provides religious protection in the
prison context and in the land use regulation context. 15 RLUIPA will trigger strict scrutiny
regardless of whether the burden is a generally applicable rule whenever a person or religious
group is substantially burdened by a state government. 16
B. Sacred Sites
While the government regards sacred sites as specifically defined locations on federally
owned land that are used for or have some significance to Native American religious practices,
Native American sacred sites are not so easily defined. A sacred site is not about the land drawn
out on a map, but things that exist at the location like “plants, animals, sound light, view shed,
and other sometimes intangible features.”17 The significance of a sacred site’s broader landscape
is the reason why many cases argue that government action on a sacred site is a desecration even
though the Native Americans are not denied access to the land itself. 18
The conflict surrounding sacred sites is a long-term consequence of the Indian Removal
Act of 1830, where President Jackson and Congress exercised an excessive amount of power in
facilitating the removal of Native American tribes from the south to land west of the Mississippi
river.19 The removal, infamously known as the trail of tears, led to the physical removal of

13

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521, 536 U.S. 507 (1997).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc (2000).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Protection of Indian Sacred Sites: General Information (2012),
https://www.achp.gov/sites/default/files/201807/TheProtectionofIndianSacredSitesGeneralInformationJuly2015.pdf.
18 Id.
19 Ethan Davis, An Administrative Trail of Tears: Indian Removal, 50 AM. J. LEGAL H IST . 49 (2010).
14
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Native Americans from their ancestral lands but it also stripped their title to those lands. 20 The
relocation of Native Americans on federal land began the reservation system and led to years’
worth of conflict regarding land ownership and the Native American tribes. While there are
cultural differences between western and native concepts of land ownership, the issue of sacred
sites is not simply the contradiction between the idea of land as something that is owned versus
land as something that is sacred. The crux of the issue in sacred site cases is that the U.S.
government took land from the Native Americans and now uses its self-proclaimed ownership of
that land as the very foundation of its case against Native Americans’ free exercise of religion.
However, despite their contribution to the problem, the government has tried to protect
sacred sites. In the 1970s, Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
(“AIRFA”), which was created with general language that vowed to “protect and preserve”
Native Americans’ freedom of religion. 21 Congress amended AIRFA over the years to include
provisions like the decriminalization of Peyote for religious purposes.22 In 1996, President
Clinton, by Executive Order 13007, added a provision regarding sacred sites. 23 The provision
stated that, to the extent reasonable, the federal government would allow Native Americans
access to sacred sites on federal land and avoid activity that would diminish the sacredness of
that land.24 While this seemed promising, AIRFA and Executive Order 13007 had no teeth
because they did not create a cause of action or rights that may be judicially enforced. 25

20

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978).
22 Id.
23 Exec. Order No. 13007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26771 (May 24, 1996), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1996-0529/pdf/96-13597.pdf.
24 Id.
25 Stephanie H. Barclay & Michalyn Steele, Rethinking Protections For Indigenous Sacred Sites, 134 H ARV. L.
REV. 1294, 1320 (2021).
21
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Some protection is available under the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”) and
the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). NHPA was amended to include preservation
programs for tribe history and can nominate sacred sites for historic preservation, which could
ward off some of the government action that would diminish the sacredness of the site. 26 NEPA
does not have as strong of a reach as NHPA, but it requires federal agencies to create
environmental impact statements for their actions. 27 These statements may be persuasive to
government agencies that have the authority to protect a site.28
Given these congressional acts, some federal agencies have been proactive about
protecting Native American religious practices on their sacred sites but a consequential issue
with respect to these protections are Establishment Clause claims. Establishment Clause claims
can have unpredictable outcomes for the Native Americans protected by the challenged
governmental action because the test for Establishment Clause violations is unclear, as a court
could choose to use the Lemon test, Justice Kennedy’s coercion test from Lee v. Weisman, or
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test from Lynch v. Donnelly.29 Fortunately, many Establishment
Clause claims against the protection of sacred sites have failed. 30 For example, Devil’s Tower is
a Native American sacred site, where religious ceremonies are held during the month of June,
but the monument has also become a recreational spot for rock climbers. 31 Despite the clear
issues this posed for the sacredness of the space, elders also feared that it would be difficult to
teach native children of the monument’s sacredness when the children could see people playing
on the site.32 In respect of the Native Americans’ exercise of religion, the National Park Service

26

Id. at 1318.
Id. at 1319.
28 Id.
29 Joel Brady, Comment, "Land is Itself a Sacred, Living Being": Native American Sacred Site Protection on
Federal Public Lands Amidst the Shadows of Bear Lodge, 24 AM. I NDIAN L. REV. 153 (1999).
30 Id.
31 Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 8 16 (10th Cir. 1999).
32 Brady, supra note 29 at 166.
27
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developed a plan that asked rock climbers to voluntarily refrain from climbing Devil’s tower
during June, which the Secretary of the Interior approved. 33 The rock climbers, with the Bear
Lodge Municipal Use Association, claimed the Secretary’s approval was a violation of the
Establishment Clause.34 Rather than decide on the Establishment Clause issue, the court found
that the plaintiffs, who were not denied access to the monument, had no standing. 35 Lack of
standing has been used in several similar cases to avoid reaching the constitutional issue.36
II. Lyng and its Constraints
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n. is the bedrock of sacred site litigation in
this country. In Lyng, the government sought to construct a road in California that would connect
two towns, Gasquet and Orleans, dubbing it the G-O Road.37 Six miles of the road was to run
through the Six Rivers National Forest’s Chimney Rock Park, where three Native American
tribes were known to hold rituals.38 The construction of the G-O road was a disruption to the
Native American’s religious practice, not because it made the land inaccessible, but because it
disrupted the “privacy, silence, and undisturbed natural setting” needed for the religious
practice.39 The Supreme Court interpreted the word “prohibit” in the Free Exercise Clause to
govern what the government could do to the individual.40 Relying on the Sherbert/Yoder test, the
Court found that the construction of the G-O road did not violate the Native Americans’ rights to
free exercise because it did not coerce the Native American tribes into choosing between

33

Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d at 815.
Id.
35 Id. at 822.
36 Nat. Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002) (An Establishment Clause claim
against a voluntary ban on non-native people visiting the Rainbow Bridge was dismissed for lack of standing.)
37 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 461 (1988).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450.
34
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practicing their religion and giving up a government benefit (as had been the case in Sherbert) or
practicing their religion and facing a civil or criminal penalty (as had been the case in Yoder).41
While neither Sherbert nor Yoder relate to Native American religion, the Court also
compared Lyng to an early Supreme Court case with a Native American Plaintiff, Bowen v.
Roy.42 In that case, the Native American parents of a two-year-old challenged a statute that
would require their daughter be assigned a social security number in order to receive the benefits
of certain welfare programs.43 The parents believed that assigning their daughter a social security
number would rob her of her spirt.44 The parents failed on their free exercise claim as the court in
Bowen found that the government could not be required to conduct its internal affairs to
“comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. 45 ” The Court argues that Lyng and
Bowen are not distinguishable because both cases challenge government action that interferes
with individuals’ spiritual fulfillment.46 Like in Bowen, the Court upholds that if the government
were required to satisfy “every citizen’s religious needs and desires,” as opposed to avoiding
burdens on religion, it would be impossible to operate.47
In his Lyng dissent, Justice Brennan argues that the majority’s “refusal” to find a
constitutional injury in this case could extinguish Native American religious practice altogether,
by offering no constitutional protection to Native Americans.48 Justice Brennan explains that the
reason the Court applied strict scrutiny in Yoder was not because the law exerted an “affirmative
coercion,” but because the impact of the law could destroy Amish communities. 49 He suggests

41

Id.
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
43 Id. at 2150.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 2151.
46 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448.
47 Id. at 452.
48 Id. at 469.
49 Id. at 466.
42

Clemens 10
that the form of coercion, like a criminal sanction in Yoder or a denial of a government benefit in
Sherbert, should not trigger First Amendment protection.50 Rather, the Court should consider an
“effects test.”51
The majority acknowledges that the impact of the G-O road on the Native Americans
“will doom their religion.”52 However, the majority is not willing to find the impact on the
religion is a constitutional injury. They focus on the fact patterns of previous cases and decide on
coercion as threshold for free exercise claims, but the Free Exercise Clause has no language that
suggests the range of substantial burdens to religion is limited to coercion.53 The majority notes
the importance of the word “prohibit” in the Free Exercise Clause and Justice Brennan agrees,
arguing that the word prohibit does not only apply to situations where the government coerces
“affirmative conduct.”54 The free exercise of religion is still prohibited when government action
makes practicing one’s faith impossible.55
Justice Brennan proposes that, in the case of Native American sacred sites, Native
American plaintiffs should show “centrality” of the site to trigger strict scrutiny, similar to prior
sacred site cases like Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority.56 The court in Sequoyah found
that the Native American plaintiff could not prove the sacred site of the Tellico Dam inseparable
from their way of life and did not grant the plaintiff’s request for injunction against the
completion of the dam.57 This centrality must be greater than claiming a site is sacred but need
not rise to the level of proving the government action destroys their religion. 58

50

Id.
Id. at 469.
52 Id. at 470.
53 Id. at 464.
54 Id. at 468.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 473.
57 Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980).
58 Id.
51
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III. Lower Court Decisions After Lyng
Justice Brennan’s prediction that the majority’s holding in Lyng would offer no
constitutional protection for Native Americans became a reality as the precedent set by Lyng
continues to frustrate Native American Religious practices up to today.
Two years after Lyng was decided, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona held
that a proposed uranium mine on the Havasupai Tribe’s sacred site in Kaibab National Forest
was not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause as it was indistinguishable from Lyng and failed
on the same grounds.59 In Havasupai Tribe v. United States, the Native American plaintiffs
offered three ways in which their case differed from Lyng. First, that the site of the uranium mine
was central to their “universe,” as the mining would “kill their deities, and destroy their
religion.60 ” However, the district court did not find that this was any different from Lyng, or that
the mine offended their constitutional rights.61 This may not come as a surprise since Justice
Brennan’s dissent highlighted that the decision in Lyng would have the effect of destroying the
Native American plaintiffs’ religion.62 Second, the mining was a private activity as compared to
the G-O road in Lyng.63 The court found that this was insignificant because the land in both cases
was owned by the government.64 Third, that there was a no trespassing sign that effectively
denied access of the Havasupai people to their sacred site. 65 The court decided that plaintiffs
were not denied access by the sign because no Havasupai person tried to trespass and, as a result,
no one was stopped.66 Based on the court’s response to the plaintiffs’ distinguishing factors, the

59

Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1475 (D. Ariz. 1990).
Id. at 1486.
61 Id. at 1484.
62 Id. at 1486.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
60
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court not only relied on Lyng but broadened its application to apply even when it completely
forecloses religion, a private actor is doing the challenged act, and access is theoretically
denied.67
While RFRA was enacted in 1993 for stronger protection of religious freedom postSmith, the Ninth circuit held that RFRA simply reinstated the Sherbert/Yoder test of a substantial
burden as interpreted in Lyng, requiring the threshold of coercive government action. In Navajo
Nation v. United States Forest Services, the Ninth circuit held that Lyng controlled the Navajo
Nation’s RFRA claim.68
To understand Navajo Nation, we must first review a pre-Lyng decision of the District of
Columbia Circuit, Wilson v. Block.69 Prior to the infamous litigation in Navajo Nation v. Forest
Services, the Forest Service permitted the expansion of the Snowbowl which threatened to
diminish the sacredness of their Peaks, as the Hopi people believed the Peaks were a living deity
and the artificial construction atop them would result in a loss of their healing power. 70 The
Native American plaintiffs brought both a free exercise claim and an AIRFA claim. 71 The court
found that the plaintiffs failed on their free exercise claim because they could not prove that their
religious exercise was substantially burdened. They were not penalized for their religious belief,
as was the case in Sherbert, and they were not denied access to the Peaks. 72 The Native
American plaintiffs also failed on their AIRFA claim because the court found that AIRFA only

67

Id.
Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008).
69 Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (1983).
70 Id.
71 Id. 739.
72 Id.
68
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requires government agencies to consider the impact on native people, not to “declare the
protection of Indian religions to be an overriding federal policy.73 ”
Twenty-five years later, litigation arose from the Snowbowl again. The Navajo Nation
filed a RFRA claim against the Forest Services’ use of recycled wastewater to make artificial
snow for the Snowbowl ski resort on the San Francisco Peaks.74 While the use of wastewater to
create artificial snow on the Peaks diminished their sacredness, the Navajo Nation was not
denied access or the ability to practice rituals on any part of the Peaks.75
Based on the Supreme Court’s analysis of Yoder in Lyng, the Ninth circuit held that Lyng
and Navajo Nation were indistinguishable and thus, the Navajo Nation’s RFRA claim should
fail.76 While the plaintiffs argued that Lyng should not apply because it failed to analyze
Sherbert, the Ninth Circuit found that the Sherbert analysis was not necessary because there was
no government benefit in either case.77 As a result, the Navajo Nation’s RFRA claim failed.78
The Native American plaintiffs in Navajo Nation also made a RLUIPA claim, but the
court found that the claim did not apply in this case because the Forest Services is a federal
agency and RLUIPA is reserved for state and local governmental actions.79 Further, the Peaks
are public land and RLUIPA applies to regulations of private land. 80
One federal district court did not view Lyng as an obstacle. In 2008, the same year that
Navajo Nation was decided, the Oklahoma Western District Court granted the Comanche
Nation’s preliminary injunction on the basis that the Comanche Nation was likely to succeed on

73

Id. at 746.
Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1066.
75 Id. at 1071.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1073.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1077.
80 Id.
74
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their claims.81 Regarding the Native American plaintiffs’ RFRA claim, the court found that
construction of an Army Training Support Center warehouse that would obstruct the view of the
Medicine Bluffs, which is central to the Comanche people’s religious practice, was a substantial
burden.82 In deciding this, the Judge used the Tenth Circuit’s definition of substantial burden in
Thiry v. Carlson, which occurs when people are severely restricted from religious “conduct or
expression” or are denied “reasonable opportunities to engage in” their religious practices. 83
The Comanche people did not need to file for a permanent injunction against the
warehouse specifically because the Army decided on a different location. 84 However, the United
States did not note Comanche Nation v. United States’ departure from Lyng and Navajo Nation’s
definition of a substantial burden when opposing Navajo Nation’s appeal to the Supreme Court
in 2009, nor was this departure ever addressed since the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 85
Despite the Comanche Nation’s success, it was a district court decision on a preliminary
injunction, and did not hold the precedential weight that Navajo Nation has since held over
RFRA claims in the sacred site context.
Even a case that began prior to the Navajo Nation decision fell victim to its precedent as
the case traveled through the courts. In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, the Snoqualmie Tribe
considered the Snoqualmie Falls a sacred site because the Falls were a part of Snoqualmie
Tribe’s creation story and the center of their religious practices.86 The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) relicensed Puget Sound Energy’s hydroelectric project for forty years,

81

Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73283 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 23,
2008).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Lieutenant Colonel James E. Key, This Land is My Land: The Tension Between Federal Use of Public Lands and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 65 A.F. L. REV. 51 (2010).
85 Id.
86 Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008).
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and the Tribe brought a RFRA claim to FERC because the project denied them access to the
Falls for religious practices and the dam necessary for the project “eliminat[ed] the mist
necessary for the Tribe's religious experiences.87 ” Navajo Nation had not been decided when the
Tribe brought their RFRA claim to FERC, but by the time Snoqualmie Indian Tribe reached the
Ninth Circuit, the court relied on Navajo Nation. It decided that the diminishment of the Fall’s
sacredness did not meet the burden necessary to succeed on a RFRA claim, because there was no
coercive government action.88
Following the Snoqualmie Tribe’s case, the decision in Navajo Nation has been
consistently fatal to RFRA claims brought by Native American plaintiffs. In South Fork Band v.
United States DOI, a gold mining corporation sought to expand their existing project in Nevada,
including parts of Mt. Tenabo, a sacred site.89 The Native American Plaintiffs filed for a
preliminary injunction against the expansion on the basis of a RFRA claim.90 However, the court
affirmed the mining corporation’s motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the
RFRA claim because the Native American Plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on their claims. 91
Due to reliance on Navajo Nation, the court found, yet again, that the plaintiffs were not forced
to choose between practicing their religion and giving up a government benefit (as in Sherbert)
or practicing their religion and facing a civil or criminal penalty (as in Yoder).92
In 2016, the struggles Native Americans faced in protecting their sacred sites became
national news as roughly two hundred tribes joined to protest the construction of the Dakota
Access pipeline.93 The protest was highly publicized, likely due to the presence of the National
87

Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1214.
89 S. Fork Band v. United States DOI, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1195 (D. Nev. 2009).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1198.
92 Id.
93 Id.
88
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Guard in armored vehicles and the three hundred protestors who were injured because of it.94
The issue surrounding the Dakota Access pipeline and its corresponding litigation, Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States, is the risk of an oil spill that could contaminate the water of
Lake Oahe, which is used by the Native people for religious ceremonies. 95
Like in the many sacred site cases before it, the Native American plaintiffs failed to
prevail on a RFRA claim because the court found that they did not meet the threshold of a
substantial burden as defined by Lyng and Navajo Nation.96
While the precedent set by Lyng and Navajo Nation has been devastating for Native
Americans and their religious practice, the Court may have a chance to change this. There was
recent hope that Slockish v. U.S. Federal Highway Admin. would result in a Ninth Circuit
decision on the merits, but the case was dismissed as moot.
Slockish arose from a proposed federal highway that would destroy a Native American
sacred site composed of campgrounds and burial grounds. 97 In addition to destroying the land to
construct the highway, the proposed guardrail accompanying the highway would block access to
the land.98 Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision that the native plaintiffs were not substantially
burdened in Navajo Nation and the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement in Lyng that the Native
Americans did not have a constitutional injury despite their religion being destroyed, the court
found that the native plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie RFRA case. 99 While this decision
was appealed, the Ninth Circuit dismissed this case as moot because any relief available to the

94

ACLU, STAND WITH STANDING ROCK: Protect Protesters' Rights, https://www.aclu.org/issues/freespeech/rights-protesters/stand-standing-rock.
95 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77, 91 (D.D.C. 2017).
96 Id.
97 Slockish v. U.S. Federal Highway Admin., No. 3:08-cv-01169-YY, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98346 (D. Or. Mar. 2,
2018).
98 Id.
99 Slockish v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2021/11/24/21 -35220.pdf.
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native plaintiffs would interfere with safety as the guard rail was a necessary feature of the
federal highway.100
With Slockish dismissed, focus has shifted to Stronghold v. United States.101 The case
began when the Apache Stronghold moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction against the government’s sale of Oak Flat, a sacred site, to foreign mining
companies.102 This sacred site is especially significant to the Apache people because it is
connected to their creator, who exists through the plants, animals, and other nature at Oak Flat.103
The destruction of the land for the sake of underground mining will “will close off a portal to the
Creator forever” for the Apache people.104 This and more—the future of sacred site litigation—is
at risk as the Apache Stronghold litigates this case in the Ninth Circuit now.
Regardless of these extreme consequences, the federal district court held that Lyng and
Navajo Nation are controlling in their definition of a substantial burden, until the Supreme Court
addresses the issue again.105 The threat to Oak Flat differs from that of the diminished sacredness
of the Peaks in Navajo Nation because the Apache people will be denied access altogether and
the land will essentially be destroyed.106 However, the court’s reading of Lyng and Navajo
Nation dictates that a plaintiff will not have a RFRA claim unless they fall into the two “narrow
situations” of choosing between their religious practice and giving up a government benefit (as in
Sherbert) or subjecting themselves to a civil or criminal sanction (as in Yoder).107 The court
acknowledges that there are many benefits that Oak Flat may offer to the Apache people but
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Id.
Stronghold v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 3d 591 (D. Ariz. 2021).
102 Id. at 598.
103 Id. at 604.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 607.
106 Id.
107 Id.
101
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being deprived of these religious or spiritual benefits do not provide for a cause of action because
the government did not give this benefit to the Apache people and then take it away.108
Despite their clear aversion to it, the court in Stronghold had their hands tied by the
precedent set by Lyng and Navajo Nation, but this could change as litigation rises to the Ninth
Circuit.
IV. Looking to the Future of Sacred Sites in the Courts
Stronghold v. United States’ appeal may seem futile as sacred site litigation has been at a
standstill since Navajo Nation, but recent Supreme Court decisions on RFRA claims, though not
about Native American religions, have created a conflict of precedent.
In recent years, free exercise protection has been interpreted robustly. It is easier for
plaintiffs to prove their religious freedom has been burdened, and harder for the government to
defend its laws. The provision of RFRA that requires the law to not only advance a compelling
interest but also be the least restrictive means of advancing that interest is applied in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby.109 In Hobby Lobby, the government’s argument essentially fails upon the court’s
finding that there was a less restrictive act, despite it being inconvenient for the government. 110
This broad interpretation not only applies to RFRA but other free exercise protection as well, like
RLUIPA.111 When RLUIPA was passed, it amended the definition of ‘exercise of religion’ in
RFRA to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system
of religious belief.”112
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Following the Hobby Lobby decision, the Court has applied this robust interpretation of
the least restrictive means under RLUIPA cases as well. In Holt v. Hobbs, the Arkansas
Department of Correction prevented a prisoner from growing a beard a quarter inch longer than
the permitted length for religious purposes.113 The Holt Court found that this was not the least
restrictive means of upholding prison security.114 The Court’s reasoning was that other prisons
allowed religious exemptions to this rule, and that the Arkansas prisons could take pictures of the
inmate with and without a beard for identification purposes—thus, avoiding the security
concern.115 Unfortunately, despite RLUIPA broad application, courts continue to deny Native
American plaintiffs strict scrutiny review of their free exercise claims in the RLUIPA context.116
In Hobby Lobby, three for-profit companies, including Hobby Lobby, claimed to have
sincerely held religious beliefs that were infringed upon by the Affordable Care Act’s
requirement that the companies provide health insurance that covered four methods of
contraception.117 These methods were abortifacients, meaning the medication could prevent a
fertilized egg from attaching to the uterus, in the event that a fertilized egg would have implanted
in the uterus but for the use of the abortifacient. 118 Health and Human Services (“HHS”) argued
that Hobby Lobby and the other companies should not prevail on a RFRA claim because their
concern that the insurance coverage would cause the destruction of embryos was too attenuated
to be a substantial burden.119 However, the Court commented that it was not up to HHS or the
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judiciary to decide whether the belief was reasonable. 120 The Court found that there was a
substantial burden on the corporation because by refusing to cover their employees for fear that
the coverage would destroy embryos, they faced a great financial burden in fines. 121 The
corporations prevailed on their RFRA claim. 122
However, the Court has made it clear in both Hobby Lobby and Holt that the purpose of
RFRA and RLUIPA was to broaden the protection of religious freedom afforded by the First
Amendment.123 Thus, in Hobby Lobby and Holt, we see a substantial burden test which is far
broader than that of Sherbert and Yoder. First, the two cases use the statutory definition of
religion, which does not require the practice to be compelled or central to the religion.124 Second,
substantial burdens are interpreted more broadly, as the Court looks for obstacles to the practice
of religion.125 The obstacles that the plaintiffs face in Hobby Lobby and Holt, accordingly, are the
inability to run your business according to your faith and the ban against wearing a beard in
compliance with your religion.126 These obstacles are like the effects test that Brennan suggests
in his Lyng dissent, where the court must consider the effects of government action on free
exercise when it “actually restrains their religious practices.” 127
This broader interpretation of Hobby Lobby and Holt is illuminated by Justice Ginsburg
dissent in Hobby Lobby, where she argues that the majority departs from the Sherbert/Yoder test.
Justice Ginsburg states that while the majority acknowledges that the corporations’ have a
sincerely held religious belief that life begins at conception and the monetary fine burdens this
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sincerely held belief, the majority fails to inquire whether this burden is substantial. 128 To
emphasize her point, she references Bowen, where the Court decided that the government’s
requirement of a social security number did not restrict the father’s beliefs or choices, despite his
child’s inability to receive welfare without a social security number. 129 The Court in Bowen
adhered to the substantial burden threshold demonstrated in Sherbert and Yoder, and reinforced
by RFRA, from which the Hobby Lobby decision departs.130 While Justice Ginsburg advocates
for strict adherence to the Sherbert and Yoder, her concern is how far RFRA’s definition of the
exercise of religion has departed from those cases. 131
Despite the Hobby Lobby majority’s clear departure from the Sherbert/Yoder test, there is
still doubt that Hobby Lobby has abandoned the precedent in Lyng. In Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe, the Native American plaintiffs argued that Lyng was no longer controlling because the
Supreme Court’s holding in Hobby Lobby abandoned the presumption that a court could decide
there was not a substantial burden on the grounds that the burden was not reasonable “in light of
the government regulation.”132 The court in Standing Rock Sioux Tribe rejected this argument,
stating that Hobby Lobby’s holding did not conflict with that of Lyng because the substantial
burden in Hobby Lobby was the coercive fines that resulted from Hobby Lobby’s noncompliance
with the mandate.133 The court argued that neither Lyng nor Hobby Lobby’s plaintiffs were
judged based on the reasonableness of their sincerely held religious beliefs.134
However, the rebuttal fails to acknowledge the difference in the definition of free
exercise since RLUIPA in 2000 and the broader understanding of a substantial burden.
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Previously, a presence of a fine or affirmative coercion was not enough to create a substantial
burden if the affected belief was not central to the religion. Hobby Lobby and the other
corporations prevailed on their RFRA claim regarding abortifacients because RFRA, as amended
by RLUIPA, no longer requires the religious belief to be central to religious practice and any
obstacle their religious practice is a burden. 135 Thus, Hobby Lobby did abandon the pre-Smith
jurisprudence that controlled in Lyng.
Native Americans face the same constraints against their religious practices as the
plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby and Holt, and as a result, Hobby Lobby’s precedent should apply to
sacred site cases. In Lyng and Navajo Nation, the plaintiffs could not practice their religion
because their sacred sites of worship were diminished by the government’s disruption use of the
land.136 Further, the substantial burden in Stronghold is distinct from that of Lyng and Navajo
Nation because the plaintiffs will be actually restrained from their religious practices because the
sacred site will be physically destroyed.137
If given the opportunity to decide Stronghold, the Court should find that, like Hobby
Lobby and Holt, the significance to the Apache’s access of Oak Flat is necessary to the Apache’s
religious practice and leveling the land would be an obstacle to that practice. 138 For these
reasons, the Apache’s RFRA claim meets the substantial burden threshold for a strict scrutiny
review.
V. Overturning Lyng
Under the reign of Lyng, Native American religion is at risk of extinction. If the Court is
only willing to uphold the departure set by Hobby Lobby when Christian values are at stake, not
135
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only will free exercise suffer in this nation, but there will be an Establishment Clause violation
against Native American religions. In Larson v. Valente, a Minnesota statute imposed
registration and reporting requirements upon some religious organizations and not others,
depending on where the organization solicited 50% of their funds from nonmembers. 139 The
Court found the statute violated the Establishment Clause because the statute demonstrated
denominational preference and the government’s reason for doing so did not withstand the
demands of strict scrutiny.140 Again, in Lee v. Weisman, the Court affirmed the court of appeals,
which expressed that the Establishment Clause is violated when “the effect of the governmental
action is to endorse one religion over another.141 ” When plaintiffs who subscribe to Abrahamic
religions continue to meet the substantial burden threshold of their RFRA claims while Native
American plaintiffs are foreclosed from making a claim that their freedom of religion has been
violated, there is no legitimate argument that the government has not endorsed one religion over
another.
The issue with Lyng for the Supreme Court is legitimacy. The Court is faced with an
issue of legitimacy when they are forced to choose between overturning their previous holding in
Lyng or reinforcing the farcical and unconstitutional conflict of precedent as it stands now. The
devil may be in the details, but the truth is in the testimony. To fix the inequality at the heart of
Lyng, the Court needs to revisit the testimony given by the native witnesses during litigation.
Scholar Dana Lloyd wrote storytelling and the high country: reading Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, which took a deep dive into the testimony given in
Lyng, which Lloyd argues was not reflected in the Supreme Court’s decision. 142 The native
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testimony, as a firsthand account, more accurately articulates that burden the G-O road imposed
on their religion. It was not simply an emotional burden as O’Connor’s majority opinion
described, nor was the burden lacking a comparator for non-native people as Justice Brennan
explained.143 The burden of government action on Native American sacred sites is no different
from the physical destruction of native religions that Native Americans faced when early
American colonizers tried to evangelize the indigenous people of American and again and again
over the years by the American government.144 As a witness for the Native American plaintiff, a
Yurok elder, Lowanna Brantner, described how different tribes would have to come together and
share relics to perform their religious dances properly. 145 She explains that they needed to come
together because, after American soldiers destroyed tribal relics, no tribe alone had the necessary
relics.146
Due to AIRFA requirements, the Forest Service in Lyng had Theodoratus Cultural
Research create a five hundred page report that studied the culture of the High Country of the
Native Americans in the case.147 The study concluded that the G-O road should not be built.148 It
compared the usual highway debris of “empty beer cans and used condoms” on the land of the
High Country to the desecration those inappropriate items would have on a cathedral alter, as
both religions emphasis abstinence in the pursuit of spirituality. 149 Further, one of the Native
American witnesses described the construction of the G-O road as the equivalent running a
bulldozer “through the white man’s church.150 ” The research and testimony offered on behalf of
the Native American plaintiffs lead to Lloyd to use the expression “burden of invasion” to
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describe the government action against sacred sites, that is both destructive and the lasting
pervasiveness of colonialism.151
This idea of a burden of invasion arising from the testimony of the Lyng case is what the
Court can use to overturn the decision in Lyng. The same way that the culmination of Sherbert
and Yoder created the definition of substantial burden that courts have used in the absence of a
definition proscribed by RFRA, the Court should expand the definition of substantial burden to
include the burden of invasion.152 Expanding the definition of substantial burden now is no
different from the way in which the Court considered the burden of a criminal sanction in Yoder,
years after Sherbert.153 Further, it is no different than the influence RLUIPA had on the RFRA
claim in Hobby Lobby.154 The law changes and grows as the need for it arises. Here, the Native
American people need the Sherbert/Yoder standard to broaden for the sake preserving what is
left of their religious practice.
VI. Conclusion
The testimony in Lyng itself makes the case that the desecration of sacred sites would not
be tolerated if it were a Christian Church being destroyed instead. While there may be
differences between western and native ideology regarding ownership of land, the sacred ness of
the High Country in Lyng is no different from the belief that Christ is fully present in the
sacrament of the Eucharist. The only real difference is that, to save face in light of their narrow
precedent and to conform to the social norms of mainstream religion, the Court has thus far
refused to understand native testimony and experience. If the Court does not overturn Lyng at the
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next available opportunity, it will not only establish that Lyng is good law, but it will also
establish mainstream religions as the official religions of the United States of America.

